

UX Usability Methods for Enterprise/Expert Systems


Matt Sharpe


Matt Guibert

NASA Ames Research Center
Human Computer Interaction Group
October 2015



NASA Centers






NASA Ames Research Center





The HCI Group


- We are an *applied* HCI group.
 - 18 production systems
 - 19 production integrations
- We build engineering data systems and integrations:
 - Web systems
 - Mobile applications
 - Data integrations





Expert Users





Representative System Example

Operations Task: find all analyses related to an anomaly.

Historical Process: With no search capabilities, analysts used prior knowledge/trial and error to browse through the available flight folders (48 total) to find when the affected hardware flew to ISS. Once the flight is found where the analysis is located, open each MS Word document in the folder and scan through to find the applicable analysis (one document in particular was 1719 pages long).

Operations estimated this process took ~3 days.

"Spent a lot of time collecting data, and spent little time analyzing it"

"Got a lot of data, but very little information"

"If the [legacy] system had the searching capability that the [new] system did, this would've taken a few hours"



matthew.d.sharpe@nasa.gov

Search: enter keywords, record ID, etc.

Home | Charts | Advanced Search | HelpSignatures | Saved Searches | Whining | Prefs | Admin

Hazard

[Hazard] Record 5720 - INWORK

(MPCV-XXX-001) Ignition of Flammable Atmospheres (edit)

Save Changes

Basic Information

Causes

Controls

Verifications

Supporting Information

Related Documents

Approvals and Concurrences

Causes

CAUS1. Introduction of a Flammable Atmosphere

Causes ID: CAUS2 (Delete)

Cause Title:
Arc / Spark Ignition Sources

Full Transfer:
No

Severity:
Catastrophic definitions

Likelihood:
Low definitions

Fault Tree Reference:

Cause Description:
The ignition/explosion of a flammable atmosphere in MPCV

Effect(s):
Creation and subsequent ignition of a flammable atmosphere may cause catastrophic damage to vehicle structures, safety critical systems, damage to launch processing facilities, or injury

Likelihood Justification:

Add CAUS3

Related Controls:

1 CTRL2 Edit

Design • EGSE hazard proofing

provided EGSE that is to be operated in locations where fire or explosion hazards may exist, as defined by Code, Article , are listed by a nationally recognized testing agency for use in that location in accordance with or are purged and pressurized in accordance with the requirements of

2 CTRL3 Edit

Design • Prop Provisions for Electrical Grounding

The spacecraft design includes provisions for electrical grounding to the hazardous panel and associated Ground Systems-provided propellant loading equipment and facilities.

3 CTRL5 Edit

Design • MGSE IAW 72506

provided EGSE electrical systems and their grounding / bonding complies with in accordance with Standard for the Design and Fabrication of Ground Support

4 CTRL7 Edit

Hazard transfer • XFER to FLT- (Ignition sources)

No information listed

Add Controls – or – Reuse Controls

Created:2014-08-20 17:03 PDT by

Modified:2015-09-28 14:12 PDT (History)


Save Changes

Hazard PDF

Create Record Snapshot


XML

Transfers



System Benefits

- **Streamlined, consistent data entry** — provides in context training and help documentation for process compliance.
- **Structured searching** reduces search time and ensures that engineers find the *complete* set of records efficiently.
- **One consolidated system** reduce overhead/maintenance and ensures configuration control while providing a single entry point for Ops use.
- **Full change history** provides tracking of updates to individual aspects of a report (e.g. severity changed from moderate to catastrophic).
- **Complete version tracking** ensures that each version has the full analysis available in one place.
- **Robust security model** supports participation of International Partners, Universities, etc while protecting proprietary and ITAR data.



Representative Data Integration Example (1)

Historical Process

Part Number:

◆ Part Name/Drawing Title:

◆ Manufacturer:

23% Completion

Current/Improved Process


VMDB Linkable Fields

Part Number: [linked](#)

◆ Part Name/Drawing Title: [linked](#)

◆ Manufacturer: [linked](#)

86% Completion



Representative Data Integration Example (2)




ESD Requirements

Program Requirements

Program Verifications

Assessment

						DVO						OPI V&V Plan Says and/or Alan Comments/Questions
Req #	Requirement Title	Requirement Language	Requirement Rationale	Specified By	Allocated To	ID	Name	Effectivity	OBJECTIVE	SUCCESS CRITERIA	Verification Method	
734	Orion-CM Imagery	The LRE Descent Imaging Subsystem shall provide	Use recovery ship imaging assets to: provide optical data on post-	Landing and Recovery Element (LRE) EIT	Communication Systems (Comm) EIT	760		EFT-1	Review results of C3R verifications prior to operations.	Inspection complete	Inspection	sufficient for
7270							Orion EM-1		The LRE documentation will be inspected to verify that stabilized imaging assets are provided to	Ensure imaging assets are provided that capture stabilized imaging of crew module, parachutes and forward bay cover.	Inspection	sufficient for
736	Recovery Team Communication	The LRE CM Recovery team shall	Use recovery ship communication capability to: transmit	Landing and Recovery Element (LRE) EIT	CM Recovery Ship	763		EFT-1	C3R methods associated with Underway Test to verify requirements are satisfied.	Inspection complete	Inspection	Is part of underway test? They are both involved but no mention here. If piece covered, then this would be sufficient for involvement of in
					Command Control Communications and Range (C3R) IPT	###		EFT-1	data to Mission Control Center at JSC. (during Underway Test)	JSC receives data	Demonstration	sufficient for
						01		EFT-1	recovery ship communications capability. (during Underway Test)	JSC receives file	Demonstration	sufficient for
						02		EFT-1	Provide recovery team with internet access during the underway test using the recovery ship communications capability. (during Underway Test)	The analysis shows that provided is sufficient for	Analysis	sufficient for
						03		EFT-1	Provide communications during underway test using the recovery ship communications and any	The analysis shows that team is sufficient for	Analysis	sufficient for
						04						
737	Video Uplink	The LRE Descent Imagery Subsystem	The includes footage from the	Landing and	Communication Systems (Comm)	766		EFT-1	Review results	Review complete	Inspection	Is the demo different than test? This is probably



Trace

powered by Dig-IT

HOME

REPORTS

SEARCH

BROWSE

WORKSPACE

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ESD

Assessment

Requirement

DRM

show more

GSDO

SLS

MPCV

EVAT Assessment [8]

Size R-2 Crew Size

R-16

Recovery R-6 Nominal Post-Landing Crew Recover,

R-7 R-7, Post Landing Crew Survival

R-15_Assessment R-15 Launch Rate

R-11_Assessment R-11 Lift Capability

R-12_Assessment R-12 Payload Dimensions

R-20_Assessment R-20 Audio and Motion Imagery

ESD Cradle Requirement [1]

GSDO Cradle DVO [438]

GSDO Cradle Requirement [35]

65 ESD R-11: Lift Capability

84 Receipt of Flight Elements

89 Transportation of Flight Elements

90 Offline Operations

91 Integrated Operations

92 Integrated Testing

93 Integrated Stack Transportation

94 Pad Operations and Launch

95 Ground Element Refurbishment

97 Post-Flight Processing

104 Design Life Duration

106 Launch Ready State

ESD Cradle Requirement [1]

EVAT Assessment [1]

GSDO Cradle Change Notice [2]

GSDO Cradle DVO [1]

GSDO Cradle Equipment [2]

GSDO Cradle Requirement [36]

65: ESD R-11: Lift Capability

GSDO Cradle

Cradle ID: 65

Name: ESD R-11: Lift Capability

Frame: Requirement: The Architecture shall deliver a minimum of [redacted] payload for the Tactical capability and [redacted] for the Strategic capability to [redacted] degrees inclination, with a demonstrable evolution path to [redacted] metric tons.

CM Status: Baseline

Frame: Rationale: HEFT Design Reference Mission analysis indicates that launch vehicles in the [redacted] metric ton class are necessary to enable Strategic missions. The [redacted] metric ton Tactical requirement will provide the ability to [redacted] path and is called for as part of the [redacted] 2010. [redacted] lift capability allows the architecture to conduct mission types from the Strategic DRM set. As more challenging missions are needed, the launch vehicle lift capacity needs to support a [redacted] metric ton class. The launch system needs to consider this [redacted] metric ton capability throughout its design to ensure that this capability can be achieved.

Category: ReqType: Performance

Category: Authority: Programmatic

Key: PROG

Version/Draft: 01

Modified Date: 2014-07-30 20:49:09 UTC

Created Date: 2012-03-01 20:25:13 UTC

Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Assessment

R-11_Assessment

Assess? Yes

Orig. ESD Trace

Assessment Result Sufficient

Save

created by [redacted] Nov 24 2014

ESD Assessment

R-11_Assessment

65

Curator: Matt Guibert


NASA Official:

Trace v 1.8 r 997 master d89f159

Dig-IT v 2.8 r 1236 master 15404f8

Last Updated: Thu Sep 10 09:45:25 PDT 2015


Privacy Statement



Integration Benefits

- **Structured searching** reduces search time and ensures that engineers find the *complete* set of records efficiently.
- **Improved efficiency in record creation** reduce overhead/maintenance in validation of information through baselining.
- **Automatically trigger notifications** provides notifications to individual aspects of a report.
- **Quick reference to integrated information** ensures that each reference goes to authoritative piece of information in other system.

Integrated question: If a failure occurs on a piece of hardware, what similar problems have occurred in the past?



Design Process and Methods



ROW	TO	RATIONALE	Comment Type
	Add Missing records	Four cause records identify items which were present on the world's list, but not yet included in ECOS 10070. Cause record 4034 lists in the cause description search item record 0100 and cause record 4037 lists search item record number 0107.	Internal
Please: "brief but sufficient description of the word-use effects"		Most description approach is to use consistent nomenclature between the program and enterprise documentation to ensure the program and enterprise analyses are mutually consistent.	External
Please: sentence in parenthesis should also deal if the associated program is structured.	Delete	This sentence needs to be expanded and re-processed. The previous three sentences explain what can shut the engine down and that any rule should be prior to 000000 is considered to be a parenthesis structure.	Technical
Missing	Cause Description need to include human errors, where appropriate, for types of relation used. Reference WP02 10020 Human System Integration Requirements	Complete and correct causal records should be ground performed and view in addition to hardware.	
NEW: MOBILE LAUNCH PLATFORM	RE: Mobile Launcher	CHANGE U.S. Air (also not Mobile Launcher) instead of Mobile Launch Platform	External
	Austin Thayer (not Military)		
		NOTE: The structure terminology of the items referenced in Cause Description as (prior items may release items into testing pathway) are not being addressed by the Controls. Should there be a verification 1.0 that addresses the "Structural design" verification 1.0 should include structural source structural verification.	Technical

[illegible]



Affinity Diagrams

rating of
DC

Managerial
duties
(dootys)

GMIP
upkeep

Managers
don't track
day-to-day
work

DCMA mostly
self-manages
inspections

Actual DCMA
proceedings
obfuscated

Manager relies
on QA & owner
to review acceptance
data

Manager review
at CoFR
Level

CoFR-Level
review of
GMIPs

GMIPs can be
waived

GMIP
maintenance
& analysis

No long-term
GMIP metrics

Periodic scrubs
eliminate
non-generalizable
ones

Reduce oversight
by reducing frequency
of tasks

GMIPs must
adapt to
changing contexts

Needs to be
flexible over
project lifecycle

Conditions vary.
Guidelines & Rules

Ability to add
more GMIPs
later

GMIP strategy
drives during
a project

Hard to schedule
GMIPs due to
safety doc
revisions

Collaboration
&
Sharing
Caring

All parties
share uniform
QA plan

QA goal for
uniform methods
amongst many

Have an
explicit, available
QA plan!

GMIPs as
a collaborative
process

Conversation
between DCMA,
Contractors,
etc.

Trust based
on competence

Each role has
specific expertise
to contribute

Project should
always get
final sign-off
DCMA gets
bossed around

Informational
isolation

Don't contribute
all knowledge
internally!

Lack of
communication
between projects

Structured
data
concerns

Ways to
organize for
GMIP

Sort by:

- oCR
- See GMIPs
by Part/Serial
number
- Group by
• Work site
- Milestone

Process
Product
Vendors

Loss of life is
focus of risk

Tailoring #
of GMIPs
based on Risk
level (from list)

Vendors using
DCMA in lieu
of internal QA

Some vendors
can't be trusted
to handle QA

Contractors
rely on DCMA
for QA

Objective
risk factors

Reference Hazard
FMEA, & knowledge
of vendor to identify
risk

ESD Scorecard
as Risk
Identifier

of issues
found by DCMA
as factor

Look at
criticality of
item to determine
risk


Prioritize
inspections based
on maturity

Production
Δs

Not capturing
structured
data

Not capturing
structured
data


Not capturing
structured
data




Contextual Inquiry

via NASA ([Flickr 9773268932](https://www.flickr.com/photos/nasa/9773268932/))







Wireframing/Storyboards

HAZARD
International Space Station

Home | New | Charts | Search | Help

Cause
Record 48 - INWORK
Crewmember exposure to personal mail (edit)

Save Changes

Basic Information

Controls

Verifications

CTRL1

Subcontrol ID:
1

Control Type:
Operational

Control Title:
Sanding

Control Description:
All mail envelopes will be sanded to minimize sharp edges.

Related Parts:
Link More Related Hardware

CTRL2 Second control

CTRL3 Third control

Add Controls

Related Verifications

Add Verifications --or-- Reuse a verification

Created: 2013-04-08 11:49 PDT by Kristie McCracken
Modified: 2013-04-08 11:49 PDT (History)

Clone This Record - Cause PDF - Create Record Snapshot - XML

Home | New | Charts | Search | Help

Signatures | Saved Searches | Whining | Prefs | Admin

HAZARD
International Space Station

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HAZARD
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Clone This Record - Cause PDF - Create Record Snapshot - XML

Home | New | Charts | Search | Help

Signatures | Saved Searches | Whining | Prefs | Admin

1

2

3

4

5

6

Link an existing verification

Filter by keyword

Filter

Reset

Verification Title

System ID

Add

First verification

VERIF1

VERIF2

Hope I don't get deleted

VERIF2

Verification Title:

Second verification

Verification Type:

Demonstration

Control

Control Description:

Verified per NPR ####

Verification Status:

Closed

Verification Flight Applicability:


328

Two items selected

Add selected verification(s)


Cancel

6



Usability Testing

- Informal, no usability lab.
- Scenarios need to be detailed and incredibly accurate



~~Personas~~

Typical persona:

- *"Angelline is a safety engineer who loves books about the beach."*
- *"Bob is a flight controller who watches a movie every Saturday."*



Web Analytics and A/B Testing







Speed Dating

Status Transition and Control


Have you ever had another author edit a cause that you had previously baselined?



Changes to the Cause record are indicated visually. You can also view the old and new versions



Changes to the Cause record are indicated visually. You can also view the old and new versions



Other Methods


- ~~Heuristic Evaluation~~
- ~~Fitts Law Modeling~~
- ~~Surveys~~




Design(er) thoughts

Our designers:

- Write the initial test case
- Are first to run the test case
- Often double as software testers



Technology should conform to the process, and never a process to technology.



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Matt Sharpe

Matt Guibert

NASA Ames Research Center
Human Computer Interaction Group
October 2015